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As biometric authentication becomes an increasingly popular 
method of security among consumers, only three states currently 
have statutes detailing how such data may be collected, used, 
retained, and released. The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy 
Act is the only statute of the three that enshrines a private right of 
action for those who fail to properly handle biometric data. Both 
the Texas Capture or Use Biometric Identifier Act Information Act 
and the Washington Biometric Privacy Act allow for state 
Attorneys General to bring suit on behalf of aggrieved consumers. 
This Note examines these three statutes in the context of data 
security and potential remedies for victims of data breaches or 
mishandled data. Ultimately, this Note makes policy proposals for 
future biometric privacy statutes, particularly recommending a 
private right of action as the most effective remedy for victims of 
biometric data breaches. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The idea of using your voice, eyes, or face as a means of 
interfacing with a computer system has been something that has 
captured the public imagination since the advent of science fiction 
television and film in the 20th century. Popular shows and films 
such as Star Trek, Robocop, and Back to the Future provided 
examples of a future where the unique biological traits of 
characters could be used as a means of controlling computers, 
creating databases, and even securing one’s home.1 Over the 
course of the last sixty years, however, the idea of using a device 
to autonomously authenticate one’s biological traits went from 
being science fiction to reality. Today, nearly half of Americans 
use biometric authenticators2—such as fingerprint-readers or face-
scanners—for security functions and payment authorization. Such 
authenticators have become increasingly accessible in consumer 
devices like smartphones and computers.3 
Although many Americans do not seem to understand the 
technology or its implications, biometric authentication has 
 
1 See Rowena Bonnette, Biometrics in Movies Sci-Fi Security, AVATIER (Jan. 31, 
2017), https://www.avatier.com/blog/biometrics-in-sci-fi-movies [https://perma.cc
/KCV5-GHYU]. 
2 See RACHEL L. GERMAN & K. SUZANNE BARBER, CONSUMER ATTITUDES ABOUT 
BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION 2 (2018). 
3 See J. Peter Bruzzese, Windows 10 Puts Biometric Security Front and Center, 
INFOWORLD (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.infoworld.com/article/2901068
/authentication/windows-10-biometric-security-front-and-center.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZAA5-68RR]; Alex Perala, Smartphone Biometrics Are Officially 
Mainstream: Acuity, MOBILE ID WORLD (Feb. 12, 2016), https://mobileidworld.com
/smartphone-biometrics-are-officially-mainstream-acuity-102124/ 
[https://perma.cc/D7VD-HT65]. Fingerprint is now the main ID Method on Mobile. Id. 
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become increasingly popular in the last decade.4 This appeal can 
be explained, in part, by the convenience it offers.5 Because 
biometric identifiers are often parts of the human body, users of 
biometric authentication will typically always have their identifier 
with them.6 Unlike a password or pin, a biometric identifier does 
not have be “memorized” and, similarly, cannot be “forgotten,” 
making it a convenient alternative to older, more analog methods 
of authentication.7 Further, biometric authenticators can enable a 
user to interface with data more quickly and efficiently than a 
traditional password.8 For some users, the use of biometric 
authentication gives them the perception of a security advantage, 
the reasoning being that the use of an immutable biological 
characteristic might make it more difficult for malicious third 
parties to gain access to certain types of information by stealing the 
“password.”9 However, many cybersecurity experts have expressed 
skepticism at the idea that biometric authentication can provide 
any unique security advantage over more traditional means.10 
 
4 See GERMAN & BARBER, supra note 2, at 11 fig.7. When asked “Have you ever 
personally provided identifying characteristics to an organization for such a computer-
matched biometric comparison?” consumers polled by the University of Texas at Austin 
Center for Identity answered “No” or “Don’t Know” 64.4% of the time. Id. 70.4% of 
consumers in the same poll said they had used fingerprint scanners before. Id. at 5 fig.2. 
5 See Biometric Security Systems: A Guide to Devices, Fingerprint Scanners and 
Facial Recognition Access Control, IFSEC GLOBAL (Oct. 28, 2016), 
https://www.ifsecglobal.com/biometric-security-systems-guide-devices-fingerprint-
scanners-facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/2CMM-PB9V]; see also VISA, GOODBYE, 
PASSWORDS. HELLO, BIOMETRICS. (2017). 
6 See Tracy V. Wilson, How Biometrics Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
https://science.howstuffworks.com/biometrics.htm [https://perma.cc/EP6S-HKSH] (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2019); see also infra Section III.A. 
7 See Wilson, supra note 6. 
8 Lisa Eadicicco, How to Make Your iPhone’s Fingerprint Scanner More Reliable, 
TIME (Dec. 12, 2016), http://time.com/4441448/how-to-improve-touch-id-iphone/ 
[https://perma.cc/T5KV-2H5B]. 
9 See Ramya Raju, The Advantages of a Biometric Identification Management System, 
M2SYS BLOG (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.m2sys.com/blog/biometric-hardware
/advantages-biometric-identification-management-system/ [https://perma.cc/S4WD-
UMC6]. 
10 See April Glaser, Biometrics Are Coming, Along with Serious Security Concerns, 
WIRED (Mar. 9, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/biometrics-coming-
along-serious-security-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/XW3D-YEA8]. 
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Concerns about security are not unfounded given that instances 
of data breaches and cybercrime are on the rise.11 Common targets 
include businesses, large and small, governments, and 
individuals.12 From a security perspective, the sensitive nature of 
biometrics presents unique risks.13 While biometric identifiers may 
be difficult to access, and in some cases deter malicious third 
parties like hackers, their irreplaceable nature imbues such data 
with a particular sensitivity.14 Should a hacker successfully steal an 
individual’s biometric data point, any information associated with 
that particular biometric authenticator can be put at risk.15 Unlike a 
password or pin that can be changed if compromised, the 
permanence of certain biological traits results in a compromised 
individual never being able to securely use a stolen biometric for 
authentication again.16 Simply put, if your fingerprint data is 
stolen, it is not possible to change your fingerprint. Despite this, 
 
11 See Facts + Statistics: Identity Theft and Cybercrime, INS. INFO. INSTIT., 
https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-cybercrime 
[https://perma.cc/3ZRU-3K9C] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
12 See Kevin McCoy, Cyber Breach at Equifax Could Affect 143M U.S. Consumers, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 7, 2017, 5:17 PM), https://www.usatoday.com
/story/money/2017/09/07/credit-reporting-giant-equifax-says-cyber-breach-could-affect-
143-m-u-s-consumers/643679001/ [https://perma.cc/G26L-6GMK]; Andrea Peterson, 
OPM Says 5.6 Million Fingerprints Stolen in Cyberattack, Five Times as Many as 
Previously Thought, THE WASHINGTON POST (Sep. 23, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/09/23/opm-now-says-more-than-
five-million-fingerprints-compromised-in-breaches/?noredirect=on&utm_term
=.21563242188b [https://perma.cc/AL5F-6C2B]; Small Business Cyber Security and 
Data Breach Risks, INSUREON, 
https://www.insureon.com/resources/research/small-business-cyber-security-poll 
[https://perma.cc/5JEN-CGCL] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
13 See The Editors, Biometric Security Poses Huge Privacy Risks, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN (Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/biometric-security-
poses-huge-privacy-risks/ [https://perma.cc/D79U-5SE8]; Chiara A. Sottile, As Biometric 
Scanning Use Grows, So Does Security Risk, NBC NEWS: MACH (July 24, 2016, 7:23 
PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/mach/biometric-scanning-use-grows-so-do-
security-risks-ncna593161 [https://perma.cc/B6DJ-ULHA]. 
14 See supra note 13. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
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biometric authentication’s popularity as a service has proceeded 
undisturbed.17 
Because of biometrics’ relative novelty, there are currently no 
federal laws that specifically address the responsibilities of 
businesses collecting, using, or releasing biometric data.18 While 
several states have attempted to address this concern, only three 
states have proven successful.19 In 2008, Illinois passed the 
Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), becoming the first 
state to pass a statute addressing biometric authentication.20 One 
year later, Texas followed suit and passed the Capture or Use 
Biometric Identifier Act (“CUBI”).21 Following the passage of 
BIPA and CUBI, many states attempted to introduce their own 
legislation addressing biometric data security.22 However, it was 
not until 2017, eight years after CUBI’s passage, that Washington 
became the third state to introduce such a law, known as the 
Washington Biometric Privacy Act (“WBPA”).23 Unlike CUBI, 
which shared some features with the at-the-time recent BIPA, the 
WBPA distinguishes itself from its predecessors by adding unique 
features and excluding other specific provisions and ideas.24 
 
17 See RACHEL L. GERMAN & K. SUZANNE BARBER, CURRENT BIOMETRIC ADOPTION 
AND TRENDS (2018); Alex Koma, Study: Americans Increasingly Accept Biometric Tech 
for Security, FEDSCOOP (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.fedscoop.com/study-americans-
increasingly-accept-governments-using-biometric-technologies-for-surveillance-security/ 
[https://perma.cc/3TUR-369F]. 
18 See Biometric Data and the General Data Protection Regulation, GEMALTO, 
https://www.gemalto.com/govt/biometrics/biometric-data [https://perma.cc/4SK2-FLUA] 
(last updated Feb. 18, 2018). 
19 See id. 
20 Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008). 
21 Capture or Use Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009). 
22 See Divya Taneja, Washington Enacts a Biometric Privacy Statute in a Departure 
from the Existing Standard, PROSKAUER: NEW MEDIA AND TECH. L. BLOG (June 13, 
2017), 
https://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2017/06/13/washington-enacts-a-biometric-privacy-
statute-in-a-departure-from-the-existing-standard/ [https://perma.cc/T4GN-LFR4]. 
23 Washington Biometric Privacy Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375 (2017); see also 
Taneja, supra note 22; Rebecca Yergin, Washington Becomes Third State with a 
Biometric Law, COVINGTON: INSIDE PRIVACY (May 31, 2017), 
https://www.insideprivacy.com/united-states/state-legislatures/washington-becomes-the-
third-state-with-a-biometric-law/ [https://perma.cc/3X9F-ASD3]. 
24 Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 
503.001 (2009), and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008). 
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While these statutes recognize the unusual challenges that 
biometric authentication poses, each proposes different approaches 
in defining biometrics and enforcement options. There is evidence 
to suggest, however, that BIPA, the oldest of these state biometric 
statutes, might be the most effective privacy law of its peers due to 
the private right of action it provides and its hardline stance against 
the sale of biometric data.25 This Note will attempt to examine the 
language of these statutes, analyze their functions critically 
amongst the current backdrop of legal options available in 
addressing cybersecurity threats, and suggest elements that should 
be included in biometric privacy statutes moving forward. Part I 
will examine data privacy law in the United States, the basics of 
biometric technology, and introduce the three current biometric 
privacy statutes. remedies for consumer data breaches, biometrics, 
and the statutory language of BIPA, CUBI, and the WBPA. Part II 
will discuss the remedies available to data breach victims, and their 
limitations. Part III will closely examine and explain the statutory 
language of BIPA, CUBI, and the WBPA. Finally, Part IV will 
critically examine BIPA, CUBI, and the WBPA, and offer 
recommendations for creating ideal biometric privacy legislation 
moving forward. 
I. BIOMETRICS AND DATA PRIVACY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Data Insecurity 
In the world of computing, data is “information in digital form 
that can be transmitted or processed.”26 “Information” can be 
anything, including strings of plain text, numbers, pictures, and 
executable software programs.27 On most computers, this 
information is converted into a binary number sequence, made up 
of zeroes and ones, and stored on a hardware drive that the 
 
25 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
26 Data, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/data 
[https://perma.cc/L3N2-A2YQ] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
27 See Data, TECH TERMS, https://techterms.com/definition/data 
[https://perma.cc/94RQ-8Y5C] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
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computer can read.28 Nearly all businesses today use computers to 
operate.29 
As a result of this reliance on computers, businesses often store 
sensitive and private data on their computers in some capacity.30 
Consequently, when sensitive data is leaked or accessed, it can be 
potentially harmful if it falls into the wrong hands. A data breach 
occurs when data is stolen, compromised, or otherwise 
unintentionally disclosed.31 The term data breach usually invokes 
the image of malicious hackers who gain access to sensitive data 
through illicit means such as using targeted malware, tricking 
third-party service providers, or even targeting unprotected 
personal devices.32 A data breach, however, can be as simple as an 
employee stealing information that he is entrusted with throughout 
the course of his work.33 Regardless of how a breach occurs, its 
consequences impact a shockingly high number of Americans each 
year with increasing frequency.34 In 2016 alone, there were at least 
two data breaches made public for each day of the year.35 In 2014, 
some estimates concluded that up to 47% of American adults have 
 
28 See id. 
29 See C.D. Crowder, Uses for Computers in Business, CHRON, 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/uses-computers-business-56844.html 
[https://perma.cc/9CK6-T6YR] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
30 See Data Security, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-
center/privacy-and-security/data-security [https://perma.cc/46ZK-U2KY] (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2019); Kelly Sheridan, Large Majority of Businesses Store Sensitive Data in 
Cloud Despite Lack of Trust, DARK READING (Apr. 16, 2018), 
https://www.darkreading.com/cloud/large-majority-of-businesses-store-sensitive-data-in-
cloud-despite-lack-of-trust/d/d-id/1331538 [https://perma.cc/P6PT-9BR4]. 
31 See Margaret Rouse, Data Breach, TECHTARGET, https:/
/searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/data-breach [https://perma.cc/G3LA-8CTR] 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
32 See Eric Basu, The Top 5 Data Breach Vulnerabilities, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2015, 11:44 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericbasu/2015/11/05/the-top-5-data-breach-
vulnerabilities/#39dfa1ae4d04 [https://perma.cc/NSU3-9SRZ]. 
33 See id. 
34 See Mike Snider, Your Data was Probably Stolen in Cyberattack in 2018 – and You 
Should Care, USA TODAY (Dec. 28, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com
/story/money/2018/12/28/data-breaches-2018-billions-hit-growing-number-cyberattacks
/2413411002/ [https://perma.cc/3BAX-M7TG]. 
35 See generally 2016 Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE: DATA 
BREACHES, https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breaches [https://perma.cc/ZH5P-M9Z3] 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
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had their private information stolen through data breaches.36 As 
incidents of cybercrime and data breaches increase in frequency 
each day, there are concerns that such events are inevitable; as 
former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Robert Mueller 
once expressed, “there are only two types of companies: those that 
have been hacked and those that will be.”37 
B. Biometric Basics 
The process of using anatomical or behavioral traits and 
characteristics as a form of automatic identification is known today 
as biometric authentication.38 These unique traits and 
characteristics, or “biometric identifiers,” can include a fingerprint, 
voice, iris, and facial shape.39 Biometric authentication can be used 
to accomplish a wide variety of technological objectives including 
securing computers, accessing financial information, or even 
tracking attendance in a workplace.40 
Biometric authentication works by capturing an individual’s 
unique biological identifier and storing it as a data point.41 This 
data point is then used as a means of comparing the trait against 
future instances of its use.42 For example, a fingerprint reader 
works by capturing an image of the unique pattern of ridges on 
your finger, and then compares that image from that point forward 
with any input from a fingerprint that the reader receives.43 If the 
 
36 See Jose Pagliery, Half of American Adults Hacked This Year, CNN (May 28, 2014, 
9:25 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/28/technology/security/hack-data-breach/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/H42K-KYJ8]. 
37 Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address at RSA Cyber 
Security Conf. (Mar. 1, 2012). 
38 See An Overview of Biometric Recognition, COMPUT. SCI. ENG’G, MICH. ST. U., 
https://web.archive.org/web/20120107071003/http://biometrics.cse.msu.edu/info.html 
[https://perma.cc/4LUK-S895] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
39 See id. 
40 See John Trader, The Top 5 Uses of Biometrics Across the Globe, M2SYS BLOG 
(Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.m2sys.com/blog/biometric-hardware/top-5-uses-biometrics-
across-globe [https://perma.cc/Q3U7-28ZH]. 
41 See COMPUT. SCI. ENG’G, MICH. ST. U., supra note 38; Wilson, supra note 6. 
42 See COMPUT. SCI. ENG’G, MICH. ST. U., supra note 38; Wilson, supra note 6. 
43 See Chris Woodford, Biometric Fingerprint Scanners, EXPLAIN THAT STUFF!, 
http://www.explainthatstuff.com/fingerprintscanners.html [https://perma.cc/SFN9-
AHH8] (last updated June 28, 2018). 
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input received matches the previously captured fingerprint image, 
the technology decides that the user’s identity has been verified 
and can grant access to secured data or trigger an activity of some 
kind.44 This same basic principle can be applied to other forms of 
biometric authentication such as iris scanners, facial recognition, or 
voiceprints. 
The particular sensitivity of biometric data raises serious 
concerns in the age of cybercrime. If compromised, information 
such as credit card numbers, passwords, and other sensitive 
information can be used to commit fraud, identity theft, harassment 
among other crimes.45 Despite this increased risk of harm, there are 
ways for almost all of those forms of data to be replaced over time 
one way or another.46 When a biometric data point is stolen 
however, there is no way to replace an individual’s biometric 
identifier.47 Unlike the film Face/Off, face-replacing technology 
with no risk of biological rejection and minimal recovery time does 
not currently exist.48 The increased risk of harm caused by the theft 
of biometric data can potentially last in perpetuity, forever 
restricting an individual from using that biometric identifier as a 
security point safely ever again. As incidents of data breaches 
increase in frequency, reports of massive biometric data breaches 
 
44 See id. 
45 See Jessica Dickler, 41 Million Americans Have Had Their Identities Stolen, CNBC 
(Oct. 11, 2016, 8:31 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/10/41-million-americans-
have-had-their-identities-stolen.html [https://perma.cc/W5KZ-SNKL]. 
46 See Data Breaches 101: How They Happen, What Gets Stolen, and Where It All 
Goes, TREND MICRO USA (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.trendmicro.com
/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/data-breach-101 [https://perma.cc/Q6GW-2MRU]. 
47 See The Editors, supra note 13; Sottile, supra note 13. 
48 Cf. FACE/OFF (Paramount Pictures 1997). While plastic surgeries exist that can 
change a person’s face, undergoing a procedure significant enough to create a new facial 
biometric is not without psychological or ethical concerns. See Changing Identity—Face 
Transplant Ethics, ROYAL FREE LONDON NHS, https://www.royalfree.nhs.uk
/services/services-a-z/plastic-surgery/facial-reconstruction-and-face-transplants/changing
-identity-face-transplant-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/48BL-G2KX] (last visited Mar. 7, 
2019). Further, recovery from facial surgery is a difficult and lengthy process unlike the 
relatively quick procedure in Face/Off. Compare Human Caniomaxillo 
Allotransplantation: A Face Transplant Research Study, JOHN HOPKINS MEDICINE: 
COMPREHENSIVE TRANSPLANT CENTER, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/transplant
/programs/reconstructive_transplant/face_transplant.html#rehabilitation [https://perma.cc
/3HX6-HLM8 ] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019), with FACE/OFF (Paramount Pictures 1997). 
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both in America49 and abroad50 raise serious questions about how 
victims of such breaches can protect themselves. 
C. Today’s Biometric Data Privacy Statutes 
Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act was first 
introduced to the Illinois Senate in February 2008 following the 
bankruptcy of a San Francisco based company known as Pay by 
Touch.51 Pay By Touch provided vendors with devices that used 
biometric authentication to allow consumers to pay for their goods 
by connecting their financial information to their fingerprint.52 
Following the company’s bankruptcy and dissolution, consumers 
were given no information as to what would become of the 
biometric data or financial information they had provided to Pay 
By Touch.53 This incident was an impetus for BIPA’s drafting and 
eventual passage.54 One year later in 2009, Texas passed its own 
biometric privacy statute known as the Capture or Use Biometric 
Identifier Act Information Act. Finally, after an eight-year gap, 
Washington passed its Washington Biometric Privacy Act in 2017. 
Each of these statutes sets out to regulate the Capture or Use 
Biometric Identifier Act data in different ways, particularly with 
regard to enforcement against entities who misuse or misplace that 
data.55 Although the remedies these statutes propose represent only 
a portion of potential remedies available to data breach victims, 
enforcement in the world of data privacy law remains complicated 
and ever-changing due to the relatively new kinds of harm that 
technology presents.56 
 
49 See Peterson, supra note 12. 
50 See Rohith Jyothish, The World’s Biggest Biometric Database Keeps Leaking 
People’s Data, FAST CO. (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40516447/the-
worlds-biggest-biometric-database-keeps-leaking-peoples-data [https://perma.cc/K58A-
YJHP]. 
51 See Justin O. Kay, The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, DRINKER BIDDLE 
& REATH 1, https://www.acc.com/sites/default/files/2019-02/Drinker-Biddle-2017-1-
BIPA-Article-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9RQ-JRUM] (last visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See infra Part III. 
56 See infra Part II. 
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II. CURRENT DATA BREACH ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES 
When a data breach occurs, it can often be difficult or 
impossible to hold the party who compromised the data legally 
responsible. Consequently, consumer data breach victims can 
typically only hold the private entity with which they entrusted 
their data accountable for the breach. In most situations, impacted 
victims have one of four options: (1) a private lawsuit, (2) a class 
action suit, (3) private arbitration, or (4) state attorneys general 
action.57 
A. Private Lawsuits 
Bringing a private suit for a data breach can be a complicated 
process depending on which state a victim finds herself in. Few 
states have statutes that address the possibility of a private right of 
action in the event of a data breach and, of those that do, some 
specific restrictions may apply.58 Data breach notification statutes 
in California or Louisiana, for example, allow for a private right of 
action only when a compromised entity fails to notify users of the 
breach.59 Further, both of these statutes require a victim suffer 
“actual harm,” sometimes referred to as “tangible” or “cognizable 
harm,” as a result of the breach, something that can be difficult to 
prove due to the at times complex and abstract nature of the data 
stolen.60 Other states, such as Alaska or Massachusetts, have 
statutes that enable data breach victims to sue for deceptive or 
unfair business practices instead of directly addressing data 
breaches.61 If a state does not have a statute that might provide a 
private right of action for data breach, the risk involved in privately 
suing a compromised entity increases as the suit would have to rely 
 
57 See Ian Salisbury, Wanna Sue Equifax? Here Are All Your Options, TIME (Sep. 22, 
2017), http://time.com/money/4949869/equifax-data-breach-lawsuits/ 
[https://perma.cc/G5WS-9T5X]. 
58 See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, DATA BREACH CHARTS: JULY 2018 26, 
https://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Data%20Breach%20documents/Dat
a_Breach_Charts.pdf [https://perma.cc/BUD4-USAT] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
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on legal theories independent of specific laws.62 Ultimately, any 
private suit against a compromised entity may present an 
unbearably high level of risk depending on the amount of financial 
and legal resources available.63 
B. Class Action Lawsuits 
Class action suits may provide a more economical option to 
victims of data breaches, however, such suits can present a 
different host of challenges. First, few class action complaints are 
ever filed against breached entities relative to the amount of 
breaches that occur.64 While 806 data breaches were made public 
in 2016, only seventy-six class action complaints were filed 
throughout the year.65 Of those seventy-six complaints, only 
twenty-seven unique defendants were named resulting in only 
3.3% of publicly reported breaches leading to class action 
litigation.66 Class action suits against breached entities can also 
have difficulties with the predominance requirement of class 
certification due to difficulty proving that losses resulting from 
fraudulent transactions are consistent amongst the class.67 The 
challenge of proving actual harm can also impact class action suits. 
In a 2015 case involving a class action suit against eBay for a data 
breach resulting in the exposure of users’ “personally identifiable 
information” (“PII”),68 a federal judge dismissed the suit finding 
 
62 See Matt Garry, My Data Has Been Breached—Can I Sue?, MICH. TECH. L. REV., 
https://mttlr.org/2018/10/my-data/ [https://perma.cc/7XYM-TDAD] (last visited Mar. 7, 
2019). 
63 See Richard Cordray, Let Consumers Sue Companies, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/opinion/let-consumers-sue-companies.html 
[https://perma.cc/JX87-6S8G]; Salisbury, supra note 57. 
64 See David Zetoony et al., 2017 Data Breach Litigation Report, BRYAN CAVE LLP, 
https://d11m3yrngt251b.cloudfront.net/images/content/9/6/v2/96690/Bryan-Cave-Data-
Breach-Litigation-Report-2017-edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5EA-BC8K] (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2019). 
65 See id. at 3. 
66 See id. at 1. 
67 See generally Green v. eBay Inc., No. 14-1688, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58047 (E.D. 
La. May 4, 2015); Mathew J. Schwartz, Why So Many Data Breach Lawsuits Fail, BANK 
INFO. SEC. (May 11, 2015), https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/data-breach-lawsuits-fail-
a-8213 [https://perma.cc/BM8F-Q7JF]. 
68 Personally identifiable information, generally, is data that can be used to identify or 
de-anonymize a particular person. See What Is Personally Identifiable Information (PII)?, 
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that the plaintiffs had no Article III standing as they did not suffer 
actual harm from the breach.69 There, the court stated that an 
increased risk of identity theft resulting from the breach did not 
constitute actual harm.70 In 2016, the Supreme Court held in 
Robins v. Spokeo that “intangible harm,” including risk of harm, 
could be considered “concrete” for the purposes of Article III 
standing, giving courts some guidance in addressing data breach 
harms.71 However, there has since been little guidance as to when a 
particular harm is “concrete.”72 Now, while not all courts agree 
that future risk of harm resulting from data breaches does not 
constitute harm, the risk of being dismissed remains.73 Further, 
class action suits can generally be very risky with some studies 
finding that few end with a final judgment on the merits for the 
plaintiffs and even fewer produce any benefit to the plaintiffs.74 
C. Arbitration 
While private arbitration is occasionally a data breach victim’s 
choice, it is often the only means available to compromised 
consumers.75 Mandatory arbitration clauses are written into many 
contracts and agreements between consumers and private entities, 
 
LIFELOCK, https://www.lifelock.com/learn-identity-theft-resources-what-is-personally-
identifiable-information.html [https://perma.cc/5VHQ-BAFV] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019); 
see also PII, Anonymized Data, and Big Data Privacy, SMARTDATA COLLECTIVE (Feb. 
12, 2015), https://www.smartdatacollective.com/pii-anonymized-data-and-big-data-
privacy/ [https://perma.cc/A29K-3ENT]. The PII exposed in Green included users’ 
names, mailing addresses, birthdates, and more. See Green, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at 
*2–4, *15–16. 
69 See Green, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *2–4, *15–16. 
70 See id. at *15–16. 
71 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). 
72 See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data 
Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 744 (2018). 
73 See generally In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1216 (N.D. Cal. 
2014); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 
2d 942, 963 (S.D. Cal. 2014). 
74 See MAYER BROWN LLP, Do Class Actions Benefit Class Members? An Empirical 
Analysis of Class Actions, INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Class_Action_Study.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7WTR-LPM2] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
75 See Arbitration, NAT’L ASS’N CONSUMER ADVOCATES, 
https://www.consumeradvocates.org/for-consumers/arbitration [https://perma.cc/43C4-
ZL6L] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
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especially in matters related to finances.76 Such clauses, should 
private entities choose to enforce them, can effectively bar a 
consumer’s right to sue entirely.77 In many contracts and 
agreements, mandatory arbitration clauses can be difficult to catch 
in the fine print and, in the past, private entities have attempted to 
enforce such arrangements on consumers even without formal 
agreements.78 Arbitration can also be costly for an aggrieved 
individual and prevent her from having an opportunity to present 
her case to a judge.79 A 2015 Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (“CFPB”) study found that, on average, group lawsuits 
were more effective in getting plaintiffs money than arbitration.80 
Further, a study of one particular arbitration firm found that 
businesses prevailed ninety-four percent of the time.81 Although 
 
76 See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A) (2015). 
77 See NAT’L ASS’N CONSUMER ADVOCATES, supra note 75. 
78 See Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: Undermining the Rights of Consumers, 
Employees, and Small Businesses, PUB. CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org
/article/mandatory-arbitration-clausesundermining-rights-consumers-employees-and-
small-businesses [https://perma.cc/5NUE-9MJ3] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). The 
proliferation of mandatory arbitration clauses should be of little surprise given how few 
Americans read terms of service or privacy policies, and how long it would take to do so 
each year. See David Berreby, Click to Agree with What? No One Reads Terms of 
Service, Studies Confirm, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2017, 8:38 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/03/terms-of-service-online-contracts-
fine-print [https://perma.cc/8PH2-MPCS]; Keith Wagstaff, You’d Need 76 Work Days to 
Read All Your Privacy Policies Each Year, TIME (Mar. 6, 2012), 
http://techland.time.com/2012/03/06/youd-need-76-work-days-to-read-all-your-privacy-
policies-each-year/ [https://perma.cc/PGQ6-WFF9]. Some arbitration clauses attempt to 
forego formal agreements entirely; in one instance, General Mills attempted to bind any 
consumer who “liked” its Facebook page to mandatory arbitration. See Ricardo Lopez, 
General Mills Abandons Mandatory Arbitration after Consumer Outcry, L.A. TIMES 
(Apr. 21, 2014, 10:44 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mo-general-mills-
legal-policy-reversal-20140421-story.html [https://perma.cc/NNP7-ADQ4]. 
79 See Arbitration: Not Necessarily a Better Option Than Litigation, BTLG 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, http://www.btlg.us/News_and_Press/articles/arbitration.html 
[https://perma.cc/HK72-PD56] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019); Gary Benton, Arbitrators Are 
Not Judges, SILICON VALLEY ARBITRATION & MEDIATION CENTER, 
https://svamc.org/arbitrators-are-not-judges [https://perma.cc/A8GX-RW4F] (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2019). 
80 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 76; Cordray, supra note 63. 
81 See John O’Donnell, The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensnare 
Consumers, PUB. CITIZEN 4 (2007), 
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the CFPB added a rule to the Federal Register in July 2017 
forbidding financial firms under the Bureau’s jurisdiction from 
blocking consumers from joining class action suits, the rule was 
repealed just four months later.82 
D. State Attorneys General Actions 
In the 1960s and 1970s, state attorneys general (“AG”) 
established consumer protection divisions in their offices, as states, 
with the FTC’s encouragement, began to adopt Unfair and 
Deceptive Practices (“UDAP”) statutes.83 By the 1990s, state AG 
offices started using UDAP laws to “protect consumers from 
privacy-invasive business practices.”84 Since then, as Danielle 
Citron notes in The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys 
General, state AGs have used their tools to shape and change legal 
norms surrounding data privacy violations. Despite these gains, 
however, AG action gives data breach victims little control over 
their recourse as AGs have ultimate discretion over what lawsuits 
they file.85 Further, because AGs are elected officials, they remain 
susceptible to political capture through special interest lobbying.86 
 
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/final_wcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/AV2B-
L5XN]. 
82 See Sylvan Lane, Trump Repeals Consumer Arbitration Rule, Wins Bankers Praise, 
THE HILL (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:43 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/358297-trump-
repeals-consumer-bureau-arbitration-rule-joined-by-heads-of-banking 
[https://perma.cc/4L23-CYY7]. 
83 See Danielle K. Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 753–54 (2017). 
84 Id. at 754. 
85 See Emily Myers & Ayeisha Cox, The Authority of State Attorneys General and 
Their Efforts on 21st Century Policing, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 202 (2016), 
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/Myers%20Cox%202016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QED9-U4N2]. 
86 See Citron, supra note 83. 
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III. THE MECHANISMS OF TODAY’S STATE BIOMETRIC DATA 
PRIVACY STATUTES 
A. What is a Biometric Identifier? 
BIPA defined the unique biological traits and characteristics 
used for biometric authentication as “biometric identifiers”: 
Section 10. Definitions. In this Act: 
“Biometric identifier” means a retina or iris scan, 
fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face 
geometry. Biometric identifiers do not include 
writing samples, written signatures, photographs, 
human biological samples used for valid scientific 
testing or screening, demographic data, tattoo 
descriptions, or physical descriptions such as height, 
weight, hair color, or eye color.87 
The use of the term “biometric identifier” as the subject of the 
type of information being regulated is universal across all three 
state statutes however, each law has its own unique definition of a 
biometric identifier.88 For example, Texas’s Capture or Use 
Biometric Identifier Act distinguishes itself from BIPA by defining 
a biometric identifier as “a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, 
voiceprint, or record of hand or face geometry.”89 Unlike BIPA, 
CUBI’s definition offers no specific exemptions for what is not 
considered a biometric identifier.90 The Washington Biometric 
Privacy Act similarly distinguishes itself from its predecessors by 
instead giving a general definition for a biometric identifier 
followed by examples of what is or is not included by the 
definition: 
(1) “Biometric identifier” means data generated by 
automatic measurements of an individual’s 
biological characteristics, such as a fingerprint, 
 
87 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2008). 
88 Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 
503.001 (2009), and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008). 
89 Capture or Use Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009). 
90 See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(a) (2009) (“In this section, “biometric 
identifier” means a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or record of hand or face 
geometry.”). 
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voiceprint, eye retinas, irises, or other unique 
biological patterns or characteristics that is used to 
identify a specific individual. “Biometric identifier” 
does not include a physical or digital photograph, 
video or audio recording or data generated 
therefrom, or information collected, used, or stored 
for health care treatment, payment, or operations 
under the federal health insurance portability and 
accountability act of 1996.91 
B. Collectors of Biometric Information 
All three statutes address the protection of biometric identifiers 
in the possession of private corporations, although each statute 
uses different language in referring to such entities.92 BIPA defines 
such parties as “private entities” meaning “any individual, 
partnership, corporation, limited liability company, association, or 
other group, however organized” and specifically excludes a “State 
or local government agency” or “any court of Illinois, a clerk of 
the court, or a judge or justice thereof.”93 Conversely, WPBA and 
CUBI refer to such parties as a “person.”94 According to WPBA, a 
person is “an individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability 
company, organization, association, or any other legal or 
commercial entity, but does not include a government agency.”95 
For the purposes of this discussion, “private entity” will be used to 
refer to the subjects of all three statutes. 
C. Retention 
Each statute addresses the retention of biometric data with 
different levels of specificity. The WBPA states: 
(4) A person who knowingly possesses a biometric 
identifier of an individual that has been enrolled for 
 
91 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2017). 
92 Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 
503.001 (2009), and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008). 
93 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2008). 
94 Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 
503.001 (2009), and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008). 
95 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2017). 
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a commercial purpose: (b) May retain the biometric 
identifier no longer than is reasonably necessary to 
(i) Comply with a court order, statute, or public 
records retention schedule specified under federal, 
state, or local law; (ii) Protect against or prevent 
actual or potential fraud, criminal activity, claims, 
security threats, or liability; and (iii) Provide the 
services for which the biometric identifier was 
enrolled.96 
The WBPA makes no mention of a deletion timeline for 
biometric data collected. CUBI and BIPA, by contrast, both 
address this possibility in their text. CUBI states “(c) A person who 
possesses a biometric identifier of an individual that is captured for 
a commercial purpose: (3) shall destroy the biometric identifier 
within a reasonable time, but not later than the first anniversary of 
the date the purpose for collecting the identifier expires . . . .”97 
BIPA’s retention requirements are the most comprehensive, 
stating: 
Section 15. Retention; collection; disclosure, 
destruction. 
(a) A private entity in possession of biometric 
identifiers or biometric information must develop a 
written policy, made available to the public, 
establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for 
permanently destroying biometric identifiers and 
biometric information when the initial purpose for 
collecting or obtaining such identifiers or 
information has been satisfied or within 3 years of 
the individual’s last interaction with the private 
entity, whichever occurs first. Absent a valid 
warrant or subpoena issued by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, a private entity in possession of 
biometric identifiers or biometric information must 
 
96 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017). 
97 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(c)(3) (2009). 
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comply with its established retention schedule and 
destruction guidelines.98 
D. Reasonable Care 
The three state laws also all rely on some version of a 
“reasonable care” objectivity standard when addressing how 
biometric data in the employ of a private entity or person should be 
protected, with each statute producing a different outcome.99 
Illinois’s BIPA includes the most detailed description of how 
biometric data is to be protected: 
Section 15. Retention; collection; disclosure, 
destruction. 
(e) A private entity in possession of a biometric 
identifier or biometric information shall: (1) store, 
transmit, and protect from disclosure all biometric 
identifiers and biometric information using the 
reasonable standard of care within the private 
entity’s industry; and (2) store, transmit, and protect 
from disclosure all biometric identifiers and 
biometric information in a manner that is the same 
as or more protective than the manner in which the 
private entity stores, transmits, and protects other 
confidential and sensitive information.100 
Illinois’s standard for biometric data protection can be boiled 
down to two main attributes: using reasonable care as defined 
within a private entity’s industry and treating it similarly to how 
the individual entity treats other confidential and sensitive 
information.101 The first requirement is effectively an objectivity 
standard focused on market custom by measuring a private entity’s 
protection against other similar entities in the market or industry.102 
The second measures an entity’s protection of biometric data 
 
98 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2008). 
99 Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 
503.001 (2009), and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2008). 
100 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2008). 
101 See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(e) (2008). 
102 See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(e)(1) (2008). 
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against its protection of other sensitive data.103 Similarly, Texas’s 
CUBI has two primary requirements: 
(c) A person who possesses a biometric identifier of 
an individual that is captured for a commercial 
purpose: (2) shall store, transmit, and protect from 
disclosure the biometric identifier using reasonable 
care and in a manner that is the same as or more 
protective than the manner in which the person 
stores, transmits, and protects any other confidential 
information the person possesses . . . 104 
Unlike BIPA’s first requirement, CUBI’s reasonable care 
standard is a regular objectivity standard.105 CUBI’s second 
requirement, however, is effectively the same as BIPA’s second, 
tasking private entities in possession of biometric data to protect it 
as it would other confidential information.106 WBPA has only one 
primary requirement for protecting biometric data, merely tasking 
persons who knowingly possesses commercially-purposed 
biometric data that has been enrolled to “take reasonable care to 
guard against unauthorized access to and acquisition of biometric 
identifiers that are in possession or under the control of the 
person . . .”107 WBPA’s requirement is, like CUBI’s first 
requirement, a reasonable care objectivity standard.108 
E. The Sale and Release of Biometric Data 
Each statute broadly prevents private entities in possession of 
biometric data from selling, leasing, trading, or otherwise profiting 
that data.109 Notably, BIPA is the only statute of the three to 
distinguish between sale and disclosure of biometric data. 
 
103 See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(e)(2) (2008). 
104 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009). 
105 Compare TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(c)(2) (2009), with 740 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 14/15(e) (2008). 
106 Compare TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(c)(2) (2009), with 740 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 14/15(e) (2008). 
107 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017). 
108 Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 
503.001(c)(2) (2009). 
109 Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 
503.001 (2009), and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2008). 
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Regarding the sale of biometric data, BIPA’s requirements prohibit 
such practices absolutely, stating: “No private entity in possession 
of a biometric identifier or biometric information may sell, lease, 
trade, or otherwise profit from a person’s or a customer’s biometric 
identifier or biometric information.”110 For disclosure or release of 
biometric data, BIPA states: 
(d) No private entity in possession of a biometric 
identifier or biometric information may disclose, 
redisclose, or otherwise disseminate a person’s or a 
customer’s biometric identifier or biometric 
information unless: (1) the subject of the biometric 
identifier or biometric information or the subject’s 
legally authorized representative consents to the 
disclosure or redisclosure; (2) the disclosure or 
redisclosure completes a financial transaction 
requested or authorized by the subject of the 
biometric identifier or the biometric information or 
the subject’s legally authorized representative; (3) 
the disclosure or redisclosure is required by State or 
federal law or municipal ordinance; or (4) the 
disclosure is required pursuant to a valid warrant or 
subpoena issued by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
Both CUBI and WBPA take a different approach, addressing 
the sale and disclosure of biometric data simultaneously. Such an 
approach allows for scenarios in which the sale of biometric data is 
allowed, unlike BIPA. CUBI provides: 
(c) A person who possesses a biometric identifier of 
an individual that is captured for a commercial 
purpose: (1) may not sell, lease, or otherwise 
disclose the biometric identifier to another person 
unless: (A) the individual consents to the disclosure 
for identification purposes in the event of the 
individual’s disappearance or death; (B) the 
disclosure completes a financial transaction that the 
individual requested or authorized; (C) the 
 
110 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(c) (2008). 
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disclosure is required or permitted by a federal 
statute or by a state statute other than Chapter 552, 
Government Code; or (D) the disclosure is made by 
or to a law enforcement agency for a law 
enforcement purpose in response to a 
warrant . . . .111 
The WBPA, meanwhile, has an even broader list of exemptions 
than CUBI.112 Most notably, the WBPA includes an exemption for 
disclosure and sale to any third party who contractually promises 
not to disclose the data or enroll it for use inconsistent with the 
original businesses uses. 
F. Purpose of Law 
Another provision shared by only two statutes is the explicit 
mention of a purpose for the law, included in Illinois’s BIPA and 
the WBPA. Likely due to the real-world circumstances that lead to 
the drafting of BIPA, the Illinois statute’s purpose is 
comprehensive and detailed: 
Section 5. Legislative findings; intent. The General 
Assembly finds all of the following: 
(a) The use of biometrics is growing in the business 
and security screening sectors and appears to 
 
111 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009). 
112 Here, the WBPA provides:  
(3) Unless consent has been obtained from the individual, a person who has enrolled 
an individual’s biometric identifier may not sell, lease, or otherwise disclose the 
biometric identifier to another person for a commercial purpose unless the 
disclosure: (a) Is consistent with subsections (1), (2), and (4) of this section; (b) Is 
necessary to provide a product or service subscribed to, requested, or expressly 
authorized by the individual; (c) Is necessary to effect, administer, enforce, or 
complete a financial transaction that the individual requested, initiated, or 
authorized, and the third party to whom the biometric identifier is disclosed 
maintains confidentiality of the biometric identifier and does not further disclose the 
biometric identifier except as otherwise permitted under this subsection (3); (d) Is 
required or expressly authorized by a federal or state statute, or court order; (e) Is 
made to a third party who contractually promises that the biometric identifier will 
not be further disclosed and will not be enrolled in a database for a commercial 
purpose inconsistent with the notice and consent described in this subsection (3) and 
subsections (1) and (2) of this section; or (f) Is made to prepare for litigation or to 
respond to or participate in judicial process. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017). 
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promise streamlined financial transactions and 
security screenings. (b) Major national corporations 
have selected the City of Chicago and other 
locations in this State as pilot testing sites for new 
applications of biometric-facilitated financial 
transaction, including finger-scan technologies at 
grocery stores, gas stations, and school cafeterias. 
(c) Biometrics are unlike other unique identifiers 
that are used to access finances or other sensitive 
information. For example, social security numbers, 
when compromised, can be changed. Biometrics, 
however, are biologically unique to the individual; 
therefore, once compromised, the individual has no 
recourse, is at the heightened risk for identity theft, 
and is likely to withdraw from biometric-facilitated 
transactions. (d) An overwhelming majority of 
members of the public are weary of the use of 
biometrics when such information is tired to 
finances and other person information. (e) Despite 
limited State law regulating the collection, use, 
safeguarding, and storage of biometrics, many 
members of the public are deterred from partaking 
in biometric identifier-facilitated transactions. (f) 
The full ramifications of biometric technology are 
not fully known. (g) The public welfare, security, 
and safety will be served by regulating the 
collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage, 
retention, and destruction of biometric identifiers 
and information.113 
Particularly of note in this statement of purpose is reference to 
both public weariness of biometric technology and the 
acknowledgment of unknown dangers that biometric data might 
present.114 This motivation suggests that Illinois lawmakers were 
likely particularly worried about the danger of biometric data 
breaches and that BIPA, as a result, was cautiously drafted with 
 
113 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2008). 
114 See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(d)–(f) (2008). 
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these concerns in mind. The WBPA’s statement of intent is more 
concise and straightforward: 
The legislature finds that citizens of Washington are 
increasingly asked to disclose sensitive biological 
information that uniquely identifies them for 
commerce, security, and convenience. The 
collection and marketing of biometric information 
about individuals, without consent or knowledge of 
the individual whose data is collected, is of 
increasing concern. The legislature intends to 
require a business that collects and can attribute 
biometric data to a specific uniquely identified 
individual to disclose how it uses that biometric 
data, and provide notice to and obtain consent from 
an individual before enrolling or changing the use 
of that individual’s biometric identifiers in a 
database.115 
Texas’s CUBI lacks any specific mention of the Texas 
legislatures intent or purpose behind passing the Act.116 
G. Remedies 
Each of these statutes offers mechanisms by which a private 
entity in violation of the law can be held accountable. 
1. The Private Right of Action 
The most direct approach is a private right of action provided 
by the first law to address biometric authentication, BIPA: 
Section 20. 
Right of action. Any person aggrieved by a 
violation of this Act shall have a right of action in a 
State circuit court or as a supplemental claim in 
federal district court against an offending party. A 
prevailing party may recover for each violation: (1) 
against a private entity that negligently violates a 
 
115 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.900 (2017). 
116 See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009). 
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provision of this Act, liquidated damages of $1,000 
of actual damages, whichever is greater; (2) against 
a private entity that intentionally or recklessly 
violates a provision of this Act, liquidated damages 
of $5,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater; 
(3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, including 
expert witness fees and other litigation expenses; 
and (4) other relief, including an injunction, as the 
State or federal court may deem appropriate.117 
BIPA is the only statute of the three to offer a private right of 
action.118 
2. State Attorneys General Enforcement 
CUBI provides its own civil action through the state attorney 
general, stating that “[a] person who violates this section is subject 
to a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each violation. The 
attorney general may bring an action to recover the civil 
penalty.”119 Similarly to CUBI, WBPA may only be enforce 
through the state attorney general.120 Unlike CUBI, however, this 
enforcement mechanism is not provided in the text of the statute 
but through the Washington Consumer Protection Act.121 
Violations of the WBPA are considered unfair or deceptive acts or 
methods of competition and carry a maximum civil penalty of two-
thousand dollars.122 
H. Additional Provisions 
Uniquely, the WBPA is the only biometric privacy statute to 
date that includes something called the “security purpose” 
 
117 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2008). 
118 See id. 
119 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(d) (2009). 
120 Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.030(2) (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 
503.001(d) (2009). 
121 See Civil Penalties, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.140 (1983); Lara Tumeh, 
Washington’s New Biometric Privacy Statute and How It Compares to Illinois and Texas 
Law, BLOOMBERG LAW: PRIVACY LAW WATCH (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.alston.com/-
/media/files/insights/publications/2017/10/tumehbiometriclaws-privacylawwatch.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CQ9K-PVWV]. 
122 See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.140 (1983). 
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exemption.123 The statute gives a list of general requirements that 
private entities are expected to meet to remain in compliance with 
the WBPA.124 The seventh provision of this section provides that 
“[n]othing in this section requires an entity to provide notice and 
obtain consent to collect, capture, or enroll a biometric identifier 
and store it in a biometric system, or otherwise, in furtherance of a 
security purpose.”125 This purpose, as defined in the statute’s 
definitions section, means “the purpose of preventing shoplifting, 
fraud, or any other misappropriation or theft of a thing of value, 
including tangible and intangible goods, services, and other 
purposes in furtherance of protecting the security or integrity of 
software, accounts, applications, online services, or any person.”126 
CUBI also contains a unique provision regarding retention of 
employee biometrics: “If a biometric identifier captured for a 
commercial purpose has been collected for security purposes by an 
employer, the purpose for collecting the identifier under 
Subsection (c)(3) is presumed to expire on termination of the 
employment relationship.”127 
IV. THE BENEFITS OF A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AND OTHER 
POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS 
This Part will address the strengths and weaknesses of the 
current enacted biometric data privacy statutes, discuss how the 
Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act’s private right of action 
can provide a model for future biometric privacy laws, and explore 
novel provisions future statutes might incorporate. Section IV.A 
will discuss how BIPA’s provisions might provide the best 
protection for consumers concerned about their biometric security 
over CUBI and the WBPA. Section IV.B will examine the 
insufficiencies of the Washington Biometric Privacy Act and the 
Capture or Use Biometric Identifier Act. Section IV.C will address 
the ways in which the Washington Biometric Act and the Texas 
 
123 See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017). 
124 See id. 
125 Id. 
126 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2017). 
127 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(c)(2) (2009). 
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Capture or Use Biometric Identifier Act can also contribute to the 
future development of biometric privacy statutes. Finally, Section 
IV.D will discuss novel ways in which future biometric privacy 
statutes can be improved. 
A. The Biometric Information Privacy Act’s Supremacy 
1. The Strength of the Private Right of Action 
Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act was created in the 
aftermath of a private entity dissolving, leaving questions for 
consumers about what would become of their sensitive financial 
and biometric data.128 The act’s purpose, in many ways, reflects 
modern anxieties surrounding data insecurity with mentions of 
public wariness of novel technology and the potential unknown 
risks involved. While biometric authentication technology is used 
more often by the average adult today,129 many Americans believe 
they have lost control of their data and are unsure of how to regain 
it.130 This sentiment could hardly be considered surprising 
considering how few data breach victims are able to successfully 
hold compromised private entities legally accountable for their 
failure to protect sensitive information.131 To that end, the 
inclusion of BIPA’s private right of action is perhaps one of the 
most unique and vital aspects of the statute. The right to hold 
compromised private entities personally accountable for their 
failure to adequately secure sensitive biometric data is rarely 
enshrined so explicitly for data breach victims. The right of action 
provides a mechanism through which compromised consumers can 
avoid the class certification challenges present in already rare data 
breach class action suits. The private right can also provide an 
alternate means to bring suit against private entities with forced 
arbitration clauses that specifically prohibit class action suits. 
 
128 See Kay, supra note 51, at 1. 
129 See Koma, supra note 17. 
130 See Mary Louise Kelly, Most Americans Feel They’ve Lost Control of Their Online 
Data, NPR (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/10/601148172/most-
americans-feel-theyve-lost-control-control-of-their-online-data [https://perma.cc/SDB7-
EUJJ]. 
131 See discussion supra Sections I–II. 
2019] FACE OFF 599 
 
The damages floors enshrined in BIPA’s right of action are 
also worth noting. A prevailing party can recover $1,000 or actual 
damages, whichever is greater, should a private entity negligently 
violate BIPA.132 That damage floor rises to $5,000 if it is found 
that the private entity intentionally or recklessly violated the 
statute.133 The right of action also provides for attorney’s fees and 
costs.134 While BIPA’s critics have argued the statute’s right of 
action may lead to frivolous lawsuits,135 there is little to suggest 
that BIPA suits have become unduly burdensome on Illinois 
businesses. Given the surge in BIPA related class action suits, it is 
possible that the inclusion of damage floors might make BIPA 
unduly burdensome on smaller businesses that may be subject to 
BIPA suits.136 Such disincentivizing, however, is likely in the best 
interest of data security as small businesses are often at greater risk 
of cyberattacks and small to medium sized businesses account for 
over half of all data breaches that occur daily.137 Further, the 
inclusion of damage floors in BIPA likely help incentivize larger 
businesses to make sure they remain compliant with the statute’s 
conditions. 
Similar to broader data breach suits, questions have arisen as to 
whether actual injury must be proven to proceed with BIPA’s right 
of action. In McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., the plaintiff 
brought suit against Smart Carte, Inc. for its failure to obtain her 
written consent for her biometric identifier or to inform her of their 
data retention policy after she used one of their fingerprint enabled 
 
132 See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2008). 
133 See id. 
134 See id. 
135 See Karla Grossenbacher & Christopher W. Kelleher, Hazards Ahead: Uptick In 
Biometric Privacy Laws Can Put Employees In Hot Seat, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (Oct. 3, 
2017), https://www.laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com/2017/10/hazards-ahead-uptick-
in-biometric-privacy-laws-can-put-employers-in-hot-seat/ [https://perma.cc/P2G3-
HKL7]. 
136 See id; Steven Pearlman, Eddie Young & Alex Weinstein, The New Wave OF 
Employee Biometrics Class Actions, LAW360 (Oct. 13, 2017, 11:24 AM), 
https://www.law360.com/cybersecurity-privacy/articles/972212/the-new-wave-of-
employee-biometrics-class-actions?nl_pk=d5154baa-3c0f-408d-8f5e-
e2a35a0f4b2c&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=cybersecu
rity-privacy&read_more=1 [https://perma.cc/YC5R-WSQP]. 
137 See INSUREON, supra note 12. 
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lockers.138 The court in McCollough found the plaintiff lacked 
Article III standing as Smart Carte’s violation of BIPA was merely 
technical and created no concrete injury.139 Unlike some data 
breach suits however, economic harm is not necessarily required 
by courts to bring a successful BIPA suit.140 In Monroy v. 
Shutterfly, Inc., Shutterfly automatically collected the facial 
geometry of the plaintiff without his consent when a third party 
uploaded a picture of his face and tagged it with his name.141 
Although the plaintiff’s information was not compromised, the 
court recognized a violation of his privacy as concrete harm.142 
This matter was most recently addressed in Rosenbach v. Six 
Flags. In Rosenbach, Six Flags, an amusement park, collected the 
plaintiff’s fingerprint identifier in exchange for entering the park 
using a “season pass.”143 When doing so, however, Six Flags gave 
the plaintiff no notice and did not obtain written consent from 
him.144 Consequently, the plaintiff’s mother, Stacy Rosenbach, 
brought suit on his behalf. The Court, which did not cite Spokeo in 
its holding,145 paid special attention to the Illinois General 
Assembly’s stated purpose of BIPA, stating: 
It is clear that the legislature intended for this 
provision to have substantial force. When private 
entities face liability for failure to comply with the 
law’s requirements without requiring affected 
individuals or customers to show some injury 
beyond violation of their statutory rights, those 
entities have the strongest possible incentive to 
conform to the law and prevent problems before the 
 
138 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100404, at *1–3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016). 
139 See id. at *5. 
140 See generally Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317; 
Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc., No. 16-C-10984, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149604, at *27 
(N.D. Ill. Sep. 15, 2017). 
141 See Monroy, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149604, at *1–3. 
142 See id. at *26–27. 
143 Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, at ¶¶ 4–9. 
144 See id.; Season Passes & Memberships, SIX FLAGS (July 2014), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140706110138/https://www.sixflags.com/greatamerica/sto
re/season-passes [https://perma.cc/FCG8-CSJX]. 
145 See Rosenbach, 2019 IL. 
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occur and cannot be undone. Compliance should not 
be difficult; whatever expenses a business might 
incur to meet the law’s requirements are likely to be 
insignificant compared to the substantial and 
irreversible harm that could result if biometric 
identifiers and information are not properly 
safeguarded; and the public welfare, security, and 
safety will be advanced. That is the point of the law. 
To require individuals to wait until they have 
sustained some compensable injury beyond 
violation of their statutory rights before they may 
seek recourse, as defendants urge, would be 
completely antithetical to the Act’s preventative and 
deterrent purposes.146 
The Court makes it clear that the actual harm question 
befuddling other courts dealing with data breach victims is simply 
not a relevant consideration when the legislature is explicit and the 
potential for harm is this high: 
When a private entity fails to adhere to the statutory 
procedures, as defendants are alleged to have done 
here, “the right of the individual to maintain [his or] 
her biometric privacy vanishes into thin air. The 
precise harm the Illinois legislature sought to 
prevent is then realized.” This is no mere 
“technicality.” The injury is real and significant.147 
Rosenbach’s language is not insignificant. The Illinois State 
Supreme Court’s declaration that a per se violation of BIPA is 
 
146 Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, at ¶ 37. Curiously, but for the Illinois General 
Assembly’s inclusion of BIPA’s purpose, tension might exist between the holdings in 
Spokeo and Rosenbach. The Court’s opinion in Spokeo, while recognizing intangible 
harms as concrete, explicitly clarified that a plaintiff must allege more than a “bare 
procedural violation” of the statute that is “divorced from” the real harms that FCRA is 
designed to prevent. Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). The Court’s 
opinion in Rosenbach makes clear that Six Flags’ violation of BIPA is concrete because, 
according to statute’s purpose, it is the exact kind of privacy harm BIPA was created to 
prevent. See Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, at ¶ 34 (citing Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. 
Supp. 948, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2018)). 
147 See Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, at ¶ 34 (citing Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp. 
948, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2018)). 
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harm sufficient to form a cause of action is exceptionally pro-
consumer, holding irresponsible data firms accountable for failing 
to take even basic statutory measures to protect biometric 
privacy.148 This holding represents a forward-thinking judicial 
perspective in addressing statutorily protected privacy harms. For 
these reasons, BIPA’s private right of action, along with a 
comprehensive statement of purpose on behalf of the drafting 
legislatures, should be incorporated in future biometric privacy 
statutes serious about protecting privacy rights. 
2. A Prohibition on Selling Biometric Data 
BIPA’s restrictions against private entities selling consumer 
biometric data is also exemplary compared to its successors. 
Although all three statutes contain provisions allowing for the 
disclosure of biometric data should the completion of a financial 
transaction or federal law require,149 BIPA strictly forbids private 
entities from selling, leasing, trading, or otherwise profiting from a 
consumer’s biometric data with no exceptions.150 While both 
CUBI and WBPA generally disallow the selling of user biometric 
data, both statutes have a host of exemptions to this requirement, 
some questionable.151 In Texas, a private entity may sell biometric 
data in the event of a user’s “disappearance or death.”152 While a 
deceased consumer might not have any need for their biometric 
information, there does not seem to be a compelling reason why 
that data could be sold as opposed to destroyed. The WBPA offers 
an even larger list of exemptions, going as far as to allow a private 
entity to sell biometric data to third parties so long as the third 
party “contractually promises” not to further disclose or enroll the 
information.153 Such a disclosure appears to have a very low 
threshold for a private entity and could potentially raise further 
questions as to the statute’s ability to adequately protect data. By 
 
148 See id. 
149 Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 
503.001 (2009), and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2008). 
150 See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(c) (2008). 
151 Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 
503.001 (2009). 
152 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009). 
153 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017). 
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outright disallowing the sale of user biometric data, BIPA requires 
a higher level of security from private entities and disincentivizes 
the sale of consumer data. 
3. The Written Retention & Deletion Policy 
Finally, BIPA’s requirement of a written policy surrounding 
biometric collection that must be public to consumers and enforced 
by a private entity is a strong policy. Such a provision helps to 
incentivize private entities to incorporate a compliance aspect in 
their collection of biometric data which, ideally, can help to 
prevent future litigation under BIPA. Further, a public biometrics 
policy can help consumers make more informed choices about who 
they choose to store their sensitive data with, allowing them to feel 
more in control of their own data. 
B. The Washington Biometric Act and Capture or Use Biometric 
Identifier Act Information Act’s Insufficiency 
1. The Security Purpose Exception 
While each of the three state biometric privacy statutes have 
flaws in how they regulate the protection of user data, the 
Washington Biometric Privacy Act’s shortcomings are particularly 
troubling. Despite being the most recent of the three statutes, 
several provisions of the WBPA raise serious questions about its 
effectiveness in regulating private entities, none more so than the 
“security purpose” exception. While biometric authentication is not 
exclusively used as a means of security, it does account for the 
overwhelming majority of its use.154 Should this exception have 
only applied to tangible goods or services, it is possible that the 
purpose of the WBPA could remain intact, although unduly 
burdened. However, the broadness of this exception’s language, 
and the vagueness of the term “other purposes,” are difficult to 
overstate. Given that one of the main purposes of biometric 
technology is to secure physical and digital spaces from unverified 
 
154 See Alexandro Pando, Beyond Security: Biometrics Integration into Everyday Life, 
FORBES (Aug. 4, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil
/2017/08/04/beyond-security-biometrics-integration-into-everyday-life/#38724d81431f 
[https://perma.cc/27N3-TLN7]. 
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users, this exception effectively undermines the WBPA’s 
effectiveness. 
Beyond the security purpose, there are also concerns about the 
WBPA’s definition of “biometric identifiers.” The statute lists a 
general definition for a biometric identifier before listing 
examples, however, facial recognition is notably absent from the 
types of identifiers listed.155 Although Representative Jeff Morris, 
the WBPA’s prime sponsor, has argued that the exclusion of facial 
recognition from the definition does not necessarily preclude its 
inclusion, some attorneys worry that courts will exclude that 
particular biometric identifier when assessing the WBPA opening 
citizens up to the danger of having their faces catalogued without 
their knowledge or consent.156 
2. State Attorneys General Action 
While it is possible to enforce both CUBI and WBPA through 
their respective state attorney generals, this option does not offer 
victims of data breaches the opportunity to be compensated for a 
private entity’s failure to protect their data.157 As noted in Section 
II.D, AGs, while perhaps instrumental in shaping data privacy 
norms, have the ultimate discretion in choosing what lawsuits to 
file and are susceptible to political capture.158 While scholars have 
noted that it is unlikely that all fifty state AGs would be politically 
captured by anti-consumer interests,159 this is a small comfort to 
consumers in captured states.160 
 
155 See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2017). 
156 See Paul Shukovsky, Washington Biometric Privacy Law Lacks Teeth of Illinois 
Cousin, BLOOMBERG (July 18, 2017), https://www.bna.com/washington-biometric-
privacy-n73014461920/ [https://perma.cc/994F-CZZ5]. 
157 See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text. 
158 See supra Section II.D. 
159 See Citron, supra note 83, at 803–04. 
160 Further, the author of this Note was unable to find any Texas suits brought under 
CUBI through Westlaw, Westlaw Litigation Analytics, or Lexis as of February 27, 2019. 
While the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, the dearth of information 
surrounding CUBI AG suits is likely the result of few, if any, CUBI suits ever being 
filed. See Fred Shapiro, The Absence of Proof, FREAKONOMICS (Sept. 29, 2011, 2:32 PM), 
http://freakonomics.com/2011/09/29/the-absence-of-proof/ [https://perma.cc/9SCW-
3ZS4]. On March 22, 2019, the author submitted a Public Information Act Request to the 
Texas Attorney General requesting information or documentation relating to any actions 
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C. What the Other Biometric Statutes Have to Offer 
1. The Washington Biometric Privacy Act 
Although the WBPA might largely be ineffective at protecting 
data, the statute’s novel focus on the regulation of the enrollment 
of biometric data as opposed to its collection might be a beneficial 
element to incorporate into future biometric privacy laws. Both 
BIPA and CUBI primarily regulate the ways in which private 
entities can collect and capture biometric data.161 CUBI states that 
“a person may not capture a biometric identifier of an individual 
for a commercial purpose unless the person: (1) informs the 
individual before capturing the biometric identifier; and (2) 
receives the individual’s consent to capture the biometric 
identifier.”162 Similarly, BIPA states: 
(b) No private entity may collect, capture, purchase, 
receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a 
person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or 
biometric information, unless it first: (1) informs the 
subject or the subject’s legally authorized 
representative in writing that the biometric identifier 
or biometric information is being collected or 
stored; (2) informs the subject or the subject’s 
legally authorized representative in writing of the 
specific purpose and length of term for which a 
biometric identifier or biometric information is 
being collected, stored, and used; and (3) receives a 
written release executed by the subject of the 
 
or litigation brought under the Capture or Use Biometric Identifier Act from the statute’s 
inception through February 27, 2019, including matters ending in settlements. On April 5, 
2019, the Office of the Attorney General of Texas responded to Public Information 
Request No. R000722 stating that “the OAG has reviewed its files and has no 
information responsive to your request.” Letter from June B. Harden, Assistant Attorney 
General, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, to Michael Rivera, Managing Editor, 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal (Apr. 5, 2019) (on 
file with author). Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that the Office of the 
Attorney General of Texas has never brought a CUBI action since the statute’s inception, 
highlighting the potential inefficiency of State AG enforcement. 
161 Compare TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009), with 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
14/15 (2008). 
162 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009). 
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biometric identifier or biometric information or the 
subject’s legally authorized representative.163 
Conversely, the WBPA states that “a person may not enroll a 
biometric identifier in a database for a commercial purpose, 
without first providing notice, obtaining consent, or providing a 
mechanism to prevent the subsequent use of a biometric identifier 
for a commercial purpose.”164 According to the statute “‘enroll’ 
means to capture a biometric identifier of an individual, convert it 
into a reference template that cannot be reconstructed into the 
original output image, and store it in a database that matches the 
biometric identifier to a specific individual.”165 
The divergence from BIPA and CUBI is significant as it places 
a greater emphasis on how private entities use the biometric data 
they collect by only regulating data that is being stored in a 
database to be used again in the future. Such an approach can 
prevent private entities who may be collecting biometric data for a 
very limited period of time from being subject to the various 
conditions of the WBPA. Further, the definition of “enroll” 
appears to prescribe a specific format in which biometric data 
should be stored that prevents the identifier from being 
reconstructed from the data to the original image. This templating 
can make biometric identifiers more difficult to steal as hackers 
who steal biometric data will not be able to easily reconstruct the 
original identifier. Finally, while BIPA and CUBI both require 
private entities to inform consumers and receive their express 
consent before capturing biometric data, the WBPA requires only 
one of three conditions: notice, consent, or a mechanism to 
unenroll one’s data.166 These requirements appear to be less 
burdensome and more adaptable then the requirements for 
capturing such data under BIPA or CUBI allowing for data 
enrollment on a flexible, individualized basis. Overall, these 
enrollment requirements combined with the positive elements of 
 
163 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2008). 
164 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017). 
165 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2017). 
166 See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017). 
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BIPA could make for stronger biometric privacy statutes in the 
future. 
2. The Capture or Use Biometric Identifier Act 
CUBI is notably the only state biometric privacy statute to date 
that contains a provision addressing the retention and deletion of 
employee biometric data, specifically requiring that employers 
delete such data shortly after an employee’s termination.167 With 
recent surveys suggesting that upwards of 64% of workplaces now 
incorporate biometrics for security and business purposes, this 
prescient CUBI provision would make for a wise addition to future 
biometric privacy legislation.168 
D. Other Considerations for Future Biometric Privacy Statutes 
There are several additional measures that future biometric 
privacy statutes can incorporate to best protect privacy rights and 
ensure an informed judiciary. 
1. Meaningful Consent via Opt-out and Alternatives 
As businesses increasingly adopt biometric measures for 
employees and consumers,169 it is paramount that consumers be 
given real choices in determining who to entrust their data to and 
when. Key to this interest is an individual’s right to opt-out of a 
service or aspects of a service whenever she feels a business can no 
longer be trusted. It is not sufficient that consent must only be 
given once for a firm to have potentially indefinite use of biometric 
data; the consent must be meaningful, meaning certain uses of the 
data should be optional and the consent can be revoked at any 
time. A meaningful consent provision, as enshrined in the Fair 
Information Practice Principles and, now, in the General Data 
Protection Regulations (“GDPR”) in the European Union, would 
guarantee that an individual has ultimate control over their 
 
167 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(c)(2) (2009). 
168 See Roy Maurer, More Employers Are Using Biometric Authentication, SOC. 
HUMAN RES. MGMT (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-
topics/technology/pages/employers-using-biometric-authentication.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/4BRZ-QGUV]. 
169 See VISA, supra note 5. 
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biometric data, a type of control that the sensitivity of biometric 
information should warrant.170 When a consumer triggers such a 
provision, the target business would be expected to offer an 
alternative means of authentication to the user and, once in place, 
delete the user’s biometric identifier from its records. While some 
firms, now including Six Flags,171 allow alternative means of 
authentication when biometrics are involved, enshrining a 
mandatory opt-out procedure that incorporates meaningful consent 
would better hold firms to account in recognizing the privacy 
rights of consumers. Failure to comply with such a provision could 
result in liability via the private right to action. 
2. Appointment of Special Masters 
Another suggestion for improving future biometric privacy 
statutes would be to incorporate a mechanism to allow judges to 
consult with neutral, third party experts familiar with best data 
security practices. While the statutes’ reasonable care standards 
 
170 See The Fair Information Principles, PRIVACY FIRST, https://www.privacyfirst.nl
/acties-3/item/154-the-fair-information-principles-canada.html [https://perma.cc/E5ND-
DLS8] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019); Regulation 2016/679 on the Protection of Natural 
Persons With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
2016 O.J. L 119, art. 7. The GDPR explicitly defines “biometric data” under Article 4 as 
“personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, 
physiological, or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm 
the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic 
data.” Regulation 2016/679 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. L 119, ch. 1, art. 4. 
The GDPR’s inclusion of “physical, physiological, [and] behavioural characteristics” as 
biometric identifiers appear to be an implicit acknowledgment of the potential for 
biometric technology to evolve beyond our current understanding. See Danny Ross, 
“Processing Biometric Data? Be Careful, Under the GDPR,” IAPP (Oct. 31, 2017), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/processing-biometric-data-be-careful-under-the-gdpr/ 
[https://perma.cc/T984-MUY4]. Businesses collecting biometric identifiers of European 
Union citizens should be especially wary of how such information is stored given the 
GDPR’s harsh penalties. See generally “GDPR Enforcement and Penalties,” IT 
GOVERNANCE (last visited Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/dpa-and-gdpr-
penalties [https://perma.cc/7CVF-YYF7].  
171 See Season Passes & Memberships, SIX FLAGS (2019), https://web.archive.org
/web/20190122020232/https://www.sixflags.com/greatamerica/store/season-passes 
[https://perma.cc/45DY-D529]. 
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provide a general guideline as to how to appropriately store and 
protect biometric data, it can be difficult to say what exactly 
reasonable care entails with regards to data security. Conversely, it 
is unreasonable and likely impossible to prescribe specific methods 
of data security as technology often moves so quickly that 
legislators cannot be expected to regularly update statutes with the 
latest best security practices. Consequently, giving judges the 
ability to consult with data security experts, à la Federal Rule of 
Evidence 706, when the appropriate level of security is unclear 
might provide for more equitable outcomes in future biometric 
privacy suits, especially as methods for data security evolve over 
the years.172 
Some courts currently allow the appointment of “special 
masters” at the behest of parties or judges which allow a judge to 
delegate certain trial processes to a subject-matter expert capable 
of verifying specialized information.173 These special masters have 
been used to supervise discovery, oversee settlement negotiations, 
and, usefully here, make recommendations to attorneys regarding 
damages in cases with difficult fact patterns.174 Including 
provisions recommending the use of such special masters might be 
beneficial in determining whether a privacy defendant employed 
appropriate encryption and security of biometric data when a 
breach occurs. 
CONCLUSION 
In “Privacy As Trust,” Ari Waldman notes that “strong trust 
norms are what allow sharing and social interaction to occur.”175 
When it comes to data as sensitive and irreplaceable as biometric 
identifiers, trust placed in private entities is especially strong. 
 
172 See FED. R. EVID. 706. 
173 See Shira Schiendlin, The Use of Special Masters in Complex Cases, LAW360 (Aug. 
15, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/950395/the-use-of-special-masters-in-
complex-cases [https://perma.cc/6YKM-Q5LK]. 
174 See id. 
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Today, however, this trust is beginning to break down.176 Many 
Americans worry that they have no control over their data and do 
not know how to reclaim it.177 When a data breach occurs, victims 
can be anxious about the heightened risk of identity theft and fraud 
they find themselves in, even when the data stolen can be changed 
or otherwise rendered useless.178 With biometric data, the risk a 
data breach poses is not temporary, but can last for as long as the 
victim may live. The Biometric Information Privacy Act was 
drafted at a time when legislators shared these concerns and were 
worried about the potential ramifications of a biometric data 
breach.179 As it happens, this wariness was prescient. The strict 
restrictions on the sale of biometric data and the inclusion of a 
private right of action with high damage floors were, in a very real 
sense, experimental as a biometric privacy statute had never been 
created before. However, these elements both prioritize the safety 
of consumer biometric data and empower consumers to hold 
private entities accountable in a way that is almost unheard of in 
data privacy law today. Though newer biometric privacy laws with 
fresh ideas have been introduced in the years since BIPA was 
made law, the most significant principles of the original statute 
should ultimately remain a lodestar for new biometric privacy 
legislation to follow. Further, the incorporation of meaningful 
consent and the appointment of special masters can also improve 
future biometric privacy, giving consumers more control over their 
data. 
 
176 See, e.g., Kim Hart, Americans Don’t Trust Tech Companies on Data Privacy, 
AXIOS (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.axios.com/distrust-social-media-firms-to-protect-
privacy-survey-8b95db51-f137-46e3-a239-a5f304f0ac1b.html [https://perma.cc/45CX-
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177 See Kelly, supra note 130. 
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179 See supra Section III.F. 
